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Notes
Playing Hot Potato in the Market:
The Ninth Circuit’s Better Approach to
Calculating Loss for Securities Fraud
Sentencing
Erica Connolly*
In United States v. Berger, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit departed from
the Second and Fifth Circuits regarding the standard required to determine loss for
securities fraud under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Unlike its sister circuits, the
Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Broudo for loss causation in civil securities fraud actions did not apply to the criminal
sentencing context. Instead, the Ninth Circuit endorsed price inflation, which was
rejected in Dura Pharmaceuticals, as a method of determining loss under the
Guidelines. This Note examines the circuits’ decisions in light of the crime and
punishment of securities fraud and concludes that the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning better
accords with the culpability of securities fraud offenders.

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2012. I am very
appreciative to Professor Aaron Rappaport for helping me untangle the world of loss calculation; his
patience and feedback were invaluable. I would also like to thank the Hastings Law Journal editors
who made excellent suggestions to improve this Note. Finally, I have to thank my parents, who have
consistently shown me great support, even as I made them listen to securities law explanations. Their
forbearance is an attribute to which we should all aspire.
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Introduction
The past decade and a half have seen tremendous shifts in American
securities markets. From the dot-com bubble and its burst to the recent
subprime mortgage catastrophe, the markets have reached incredible
1
heights and then rapidly plummeted. At their pinnacle, Enron’s shares
2
traded in August 2000 at just over $90 per share. By December 2001,
3
their price was less than $1, and the company had filed for bankruptcy.
WorldCom and Dynegy experienced similarly dramatic rises and

1. See Stephen P. Utkus, Vanguard Research, Market Bubbles and Investor Psychology
(2011).
2. See Bethany McLean & Peter Elkind, The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing Rise
and Scandalous Fall of Enron 318 (2003).
3. Id. at 403, 405.
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4

precipitous falls. More recently, BearStearns, AIG, and Lehman
5
Brothers have undergone dramatic changes in fortune.
The architects of these calamities have faced criminal convictions
6
and headline-grabbing sentences. Bernard Ebbers was convicted for his
role in the scheme to artificially inflate WorldCom’s shares and was
7
sentenced to twenty-five years, at the time the longest sentence for a
8
corporate officer convicted of securities fraud. Jeffrey Skilling, Enron’s
9
CEO at the time of its financial collapse, received twenty-four years.
Bernard Madoff pled guilty to numerous counts of securities fraud, mail
and wire fraud, and falsifying records, and received a sentence of 150
10
years. For many, these long sentences represent an appropriate
11
comeuppance for the once high-flying executives.
Several factors, including changes in the political and public
12
climates, contribute to the determination of these long sentences. But
the most important factor by far is the loss sustained from the fraud,
because under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) loss
13
is the primary enhancement factor. Loss dwarfs other enhancements,
making the loss calculation the most important determinant in
14
sentencing.
In 2009, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit diverged from
the Second and Fifth Circuits regarding the appropriate standard for
15
calculating loss for criminal sentences. The Second and Fifth Circuits
adopted the Supreme Court’s civil loss calculation reasoning from Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo to establish standards for criminal
4. See Jamie Doward, Day the WorldCom World Was Turned Upside Down: The Giant’s Fall,
Observer, June 30, 2002, at 4; Shocks to the System: Will the Light Keep Burning in America This
Summer?, Economist, Aug. 10, 2002, at 54–55.
5. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Too Big to Fail: The Inside Story of How Wall Street and
Washington Fought to Save the Financial System—and Themselves 5–6, 355–63, 392–408 (2010).
6. See, e.g., Alexei Barrionuevo, Skilling Sentenced to 24 Years, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 2006, at C1;
Carrie Johnson, Ebbers Gets 25-Year Sentence for Role in WorldCom Fraud, Wash. Post, July 14,
2005, at A1; Kevin McCoy, As Victims Cheer, “Evil” Madoff Gets 150 Years: Judge Cites “Staggering
Human Toll” of Scam, U.S.A. Today, June 30, 2009, at A1. But see Gretchen Morgenson & Louise
Story, A Financial Crisis with Little Guilt, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 2011, at A1.
7. Johnson, supra note 6.
8. Id.
9. Barrionuevo, supra note 6.
10. McCoy, supra note 6.
11. See, e.g., Barrionuevo, supra note 6; Diana B. Henriques, Madoff, Apologizing, Is Given 150
Years, N.Y. Times, June 30, 2009, at A1.
12. See Bosses Behind Bars, Economist, June 12, 2004, at 59–60 (noting how the changes in the
Guidelines emerged from Congress’s reaction to the widespread damage from Enron-type frauds).
13. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2010); Derick R. Vollrath, Losing
the Loss Calculation: Toward a More Just Sentencing Regime in White-Collar Criminal Cases, 59 Duke
L.J. 1001, 1008 (2010).
14. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1(b)(1).
15. Compare United States v. Berger, 587 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009), with United States v.
Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir. 2007), and United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 546 (5th Cir. 2005).
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16

sentencing. The Ninth Circuit asserted that the retributive, societybased rationale for criminal punishment differed from the civil purpose
of compensation and refused to apply Dura Pharmaceuticals’ reasoning
17
to criminal sentencing. The circuits’ disagreement embodies a broader
conflict about determining white-collar criminals’ culpability: Are they
responsible for creating a virtual game of hot potato in the market, or are
they only responsible for the losses sustained by the shareholders holding
the shares when word of the fraud gets out and the game ends?
This Note addresses these competing theories for loss calculation
under the Guidelines and argues that the Ninth Circuit’s approach more
accurately identifies the defendant’s culpability and is the better
approach. This Note is divided into three main Parts. Through a brief
examination of the crime of securities fraud and the rationales underlying
its prohibition, Part I assesses the policy implications instructing courts.
Part II analyzes the punishment regimes in place under the Guidelines.
Part III analyzes the different theories of loss calculation in light of these
regimes, and ultimately advises that with certain modifications the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation is the more appropriate standard for determining
loss.

I. The Crime
To contextualize the circuit split, this Part introduces the law
prohibiting securities fraud and briefly details the policies underlying its
criminalization.
A. The Law
18

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) governs
transactions on the secondary markets. The Act has numerous antifraud
provisions, which prohibit insider trading and material misrepresentations
19
in offers and sales of securities. Loss calculation standards are
particularly significant in sentencing for material misrepresentations
20
because loss is often market-wide and can be substantial. Calculating

16. See Rutkoske, 506 F.3d at 180 (discussing Dura Pharm., Inc., v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346
(2005)); Olis, 429 F.3d at 546 (same).
17. Berger, 587 F.3d at 1043.
18. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2010)).
19. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010) (prohibiting material misrepresentations); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (2011) (prohibiting insider trading).
20. Compare Ebbers’ twenty-five year sentence for a conviction for affirmative
misrepresentations about the health of WorldCom with the sentencing imposed on Rex Shelby, an
Enron employee who pled guilty to insider trading. Laurel Brubaker Calkins, Ex-Enron Broadband
Executive Sentenced for Insider Trading, Bus. Wk. (Mar. 28, 2011, 1:07 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/
news/2011-03-28/ex-enron-broadband-executive-sentenced-for-insider-trading.html. Shelby sold his
Enron shares immediately after he had misrepresented the profits Enron was generating. As an
employee he had a duty to disclose the information he knew to the buyer of the shares. Id. He was
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standards for market-wide manipulation is the center of the divergent
21
treatment of sentencing among the circuit courts of appeals. This Note,
therefore, focuses on the prohibitions against material misrepresentations
to the market.
Section 10b of the Exchange Act prohibits the use, “in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security . . . , [of] any manipulative or
22
deceptive device or contrivance.” Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) Rule 10b-5, promulgated under the Act’s antifraud provision,
23
elaborates on the types of prohibited conduct. Section 10b and Rule
24
10b-5 are catch-all antifraud provisions. They reach beyond the parties
to a transaction and prohibit broad swaths of conduct involving
25
misleading or false information. Corporate directors or officers who
issue misleading or false information about a corporation can be
criminally and civilly liable under the Act, even if they refrain from
26
directly engaging in sales or purchases of stock.
The SEC has primary responsibility for investigating violations of
the Exchange Act. The SEC is limited to pursuing civil actions against
offenders, but it can refer investigations to the Department of Justice for
27
criminal prosecution. The Exchange Act establishes criminal liability
for willful violations of its provisions, with a maximum sentence of
28
twenty years and a maximum fine of $5 million. Criminal prosecution
requires a showing that the defendant intentionally made a materially
misleading or false statement in connection with the purchase or sale of a
29
security. Unlike a private plaintiff, who must show reasonable reliance
sentenced to three months in a halfway house, three months of house arrest, two years of probation,
and he will forfeit the profits he realized from the transaction. Id.
21. See Berger, 587 F.3d at 1040–41 (concerning a defendant who spread misinformation about his
company’s liabilities); Rutkoske, 506 F.3d at 173 (defendant misrepresented the nature of the company
and the nature of the brokers’ commissions); Olis, 429 F.3d at 542 (defendant mischaracterized
liabilities as cash transactions).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
24. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 174
(1994) (“Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision . . . .” (quoting United States v.
Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1980))).
25. Id.
26. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968) (“Rule 10b-5 is violated
whenever assertions are made . . . in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing
public . . . if such assertions are false or misleading or are so incomplete as to mislead irrespective of
whether the issuance of the release was motivated by corporate officials for ulterior purposes.”).
27. Marc I. Steinberg & Ralph C. Ferrara, Securities Practice: Federal and State
Enforcement § 7.15 (2d ed. 2010).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2010).
29. United States v. Goyal, 629 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Smith, 155
F.3d 1051, 1063 (9th Cir. 1998)); cf. SEC v. Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d 295, 308 (2d Cir. 1999)
(“To have violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, [the defendant] must have: (1) made a material
misrepresentation or a material omission as to which he had a duty to speak, or used a fraudulent
device; (2) with scienter; (3) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.”); SEC v.
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30

and actual damages to recover under the Exchange Act’s implied civil
31
cause of action, the government need only establish the “impact of the
32
scheme on the investor.”
The Exchange Act requires the government to show the party acted
33
“willfully” in violating the provision. A “willful” act is “intentional,
deliberate, and not the result of an innocent mistake, negligence, or
34
inadvertence” but does not require knowledge that the action was a
35
violation. The crux of the “willful” showing is the defendant’s
knowledge the action was wrong, but not necessarily that the defendant
36
knew it was illegal.
B. The Policies
The decision to criminally prosecute for securities fraud often has
political motivations, with the types of victims and the nature of the fraud
37
playing significant roles. The choice to prosecute also highlights the
opposing policies and motivations that often underlie the criminalization
of securities fraud and that influence the debate about culpability and
punishment. Punishment schemes must balance these opposing views of
the culpability of white-collar crime. The courts rely on and must balance
these justifications when expanding and contracting the sentences for
38
white-collar criminals.
Federal securities laws address the potentially substantial harms that
39
individual shareholders suffer as a result of securities fraud. At the
sentencing hearing of Jeffrey Skilling, Judge Simeon Lake noted, “As the
many victims have testified, [Skilling’s] crimes have imposed on

Haligiannis, 470 F. Supp. 2d 373, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Courts have applied collateral estoppel in the
securities fraud context because the elements necessary to establish civil liability under . . . 10(b) are
identical to those necessary to establish criminal liability under . . . 10(b).”).
30. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005).
31. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (“It is now
established that a private right of action is implied under § 10(b).”).
32. Palmer T. Heenan et al., Securities Fraud, 47 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1015, 1043 (2010) (footnote
omitted) (citing United States v. Amick, 439 F.2d 351, 359 n.12 (7th Cir. 1971)).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). It is less clear whether this level of intent is distinct from the level of
intent required for civil actions. See Heenan, supra note 32, at 1026.
34. Heenan, supra note 32, at 1025.
35. United States v. Reyes, 577 F.3d 1069, 1080 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[O]ur circuit and others have
rejected the argument that, in the context of securities fraud statutes, willfulness requires a defendant
know that he or she was breaking the law.” (citing United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1187–88
(9th Cir. 2004))).
36. Id. at 1079 (citing Tarallo, 380 F.3d at 1088).
37. See Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence of Corporate Fraud, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1295,
1297–98 (2008) (discussing the cycle of legislation and punishment following corporate scandals).
38. See id.; Ellen S. Podgor, Throwing Away the Key, 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 279, 283–84
(2007).
39. J. Scott Dutcher, Comment, From the Boardroom to the Cellblock: The Justifications for
Harsher Punishment of White-Collar and Corporate Crime, 37 Ariz. St. L.J. 1295, 1299 (2005).
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40

hundreds if not thousands a life sentence of poverty.” Judge Denny
Chin justified Bernard Madoff’s 150-year sentence by stating, “The
message must be sent that Mr. Madoff’s crimes were extraordinarily evil
and that this kind of irresponsible manipulation of the system is not
merely a bloodless financial crime that takes place just on paper, but that
41
it is . . . one that takes a staggering human toll.”
In addition, outlawing manipulation and deception in securities
transactions is an attempt to protect market integrity. “Fraud is bad,” as
42
one commentator pithily noted, but an act of securities fraud generally
43
impacts far more people than an act of common law fraud. Securities
fraud destabilizes the market, making investors skittish about investment
44
and reducing liquidity in the market. Stocks become either overvalued
45
because of the fraudulent acts or undervalued because of fear of fraud.
Overall, the market becomes less efficient as market participants attempt
46
to account for potentially fraudulent schemes.
The goal of protecting market integrity is apparent from the
47
Exchange Act’s history. Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933
and the Exchange Act against the backdrop of the 1929 market crash and
subsequent Great Depression, which affected the entire American
48
population. Unemployment reached twenty-five percent; repossessions
49
of houses and cars bought on credit were rampant. The Acts were not
just a way to protect investments, but also a way to prevent “[n]ational
emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and the
50
dislocation of trade, transportation, and industry.”
However, despite the potential for widespread substantial harm to
the market and to individual investors, white-collar criminals
traditionally received lighter sentences because the public perceived
51
them to be less culpable than other types of criminals. As one
commentator noted, “The American public generally has not been
52
fearful of being victimized by white-collar crime.” Impersonal economic

40. Barrionuevo, supra note 6 (quoting U.S. District Court Judge Simeon T. Lake III).
41. McCoy, supra note 6 (quoting U.S. District Court Judge Denny Chin).
42. Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 775, 824 (2006).
43. See id. at 824–26 (arguing that securities fraud creates an inefficient market).
44. Id. at 824.
45. Id. at 825.
46. Id.
47. Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77bbbb (2010)).
48. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 347,
348 (1991); Stanley K. Schultz, Crashing Hopes: The Great Depression, American History 102,
http://us.history.wisc.edu/hist102/lectures/lecture18.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
49. See About the Great Depression, Dep’t of Eng., U. Ill. Urbana-Champaign,
http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/depression/about.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78b(4) (2010).
51. Dutcher, supra note 39, at 1301.
52. Id.
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crimes are seemingly less dangerous than the confrontational nature of
53
“street crimes.” Moreover, critics have argued that white-collar crime
unjustly conflates tort and criminal liabilities, and that white-collar
54
criminals should be liable only for tort violations. Others argue that
white-collar criminals have skills that benefit society and therefore long
55
sentences do not serve utilitarian goals.

II. The Punishment
The tensions underlying the criminality of securities fraud—
protecting individual investors, ensuring market reliability, and
56
preventing over-punishment—also influence its punishment regime.
The Guidelines represent the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s attempt to
adequately punish defendants and to effectively deter future criminal
57
conduct.
Violators face three different forms of liability: private civil actions
58
59
by shareholders; civil actions by the SEC; and criminal conviction,
60
imprisonment, or fines. This Part considers the criminal punishment
regime, beginning with a brief overview of the history of the Guidelines
for white-collar crime, followed by a description of the current guidelines.
A. History
Congress created the Sentencing Commission under the Sentencing
61
Reform Act of 1984 and charged it with establishing a uniform federal
62
sentencing policy to eliminate disparities in offenders’ sentences. The
Sentencing Commission drafted guidelines through which judges would
63
determine the severity of the crime and the offender’s criminal history.
53. See id.; Podgor, supra note 38, at 283–84.
54. Michael Kades, Exercising Discretion: A Case Study of Prosecutorial Discretion in the
Wisconsin Department of Justice, 25 Am. J. Crim. L. 115, 116–17 (1997).
55. See Podgor, supra note 38, at 279; cf. Vollrath, supra note 13, at 1021 (noting that current
punishment schemes poorly account for the characteristics of the defendant).
56. But see Baer, supra note 37, at 1313 (arguing that the timing of enforcement is key to
deterring corporate fraud because ending the fraud actually aids in the detection of the fraud, thus
incentivizing continuous wrongdoing).
57. See Vollrath, supra note 13, at 1006. The U.S. Sentencing Commission is an independent
agency charged with “establish[ing] sentencing policies and practices for the federal courts, including
guidelines to be consulted regarding the appropriate form and severity of punishment for offenders
convicted of federal crimes.” U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 2010 Annual Report 1 (2010).
58. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4 (2010); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6,
13 n.9 (1971).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2010).
61. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211–239, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987–2001 (1984) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3586, 3601–3615, 3661–3683, 3742 and at 28 U.S.C. 991–998 (2010)).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2010); see also U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, supra note 57, at 1.
63. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.1 (2010). For a plain language explanation,
see Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They
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As originally promulgated, the guidelines were mandatory; judges’
65
departures from the guidelines were subject to appellate review. Using
the Commission’s sentencing grid, judges sentenced within the range
66
required by the two factors. To determine the crime’s severity, the
guidelines provide a base offense level derived from the type of crime, to
67
which judges can add points based on specific offense characteristics.
When the Sentencing Commission created its initial guideline for
white-collar criminal sentences, it specifically rejected the lax scheme
68
already in place. Instead of the previous leniency, the Commission
sought to create “short but definite” sentences for white-collar criminals
because they “might deter future crime more effectively than sentences
69
with no confinement condition.”
These “short but definite” sentences began to grow longer. In 2001,
70
the Economic Crime Package significantly amended the Guidelines by
merging fraud with other loss-based crimes in order to address a
71
perception that white-collar sentencing remained too lenient. In doing
so, the Commission made loss—and courts’ estimates of loss—the most
72
significant factor in calculating white-collar defendants’ sentences. The
73
Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s passage in 2002 further changed the Guidelines,
as Congress charged the Sentencing Commission with the task of
increasing penalties for white-collar defendants to levels that would
74
effectively deter future securities schemes.

Rest, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 6–7 (1988).
64. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2010) (mandating that courts use the guideline range unless there are
factors in the case that the Commission did not account for). The Supreme Court determined that
section 3553(b) was unconstitutional in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244, 245 (2005),
discussed in greater detail in Part II.B.
65. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2010) (detailing the considerations appellate courts must consider
when reviewing sentences, including whether the sentence was “outside the applicable guideline
range”). The Supreme Court also excised this section in Booker, 543 U.S. at 259.
66. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.1. For an example of the current guideline
grid, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, ch. 5 pt. A.
67. Id. § 1B1.1.
68. Breyer, supra note 63, at 20–21.
69. Id. at 22.
70. This is the blanket term for the significant amendments by the Sentencing Commission to the
Guidelines. See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Just in Crime: Guiding Economic Crime Reform After the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 34 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 359, 378 (2003). With the amendments, the
Commission intended to address a perception that white-collar crime was not being punished as
severely as other crimes. See Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 66 Fed. Reg. 30,512, 30,542
(June 6, 2001).
71. Ramirez, supra note 70, at 378–79.
72. See id. (noting that with the consolidation, penalties for higher losses became more severe).
73. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28,
& 29 U.S.C.).
74. Ramirez, supra note 70, at 386.
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B. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Today
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker changed
the Guidelines from a mandatory sentencing scheme to advisory
75
guidelines. Nevertheless, the guidelines remain the starting point for
76
sentence determination. A departure, therefore, is always relative to the
initially calculated sentence. A consideration of the current Guidelines
for fraud reveals the importance of loss calculation to the sentence
determination.
For committing a crime involving “fraud and deceit,” a defendant
convicted of securities fraud receives a sentence guided by section 2B1.1
77
of the Guidelines. Like many of the guidelines, section 2B1.1 addresses
78
several different but related crimes. Larceny, property damage, fraud,
and offenses involving counterfeit instruments all fall under its
79
provisions. Resulting loss by third parties is the common thread
throughout these crimes and loss is the primary tool in determining the
80
sentence for each.
Section 2B1.1 establishes two base offense levels: for offenses with
statutory maximums of twenty years or greater, the base offense level is
81
seven; for any other offense, the base offense level is six. Securities
fraud has a statutory maximum of twenty years and qualifies for the
82
heightened base offense level. The special offense characteristics add
enhancements to this base level. The Guidelines have enhancements
83
tailored for securities fraud, but the loss enhancement dilutes their

75. 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005) (finding that mandatory guidelines based on enhancements found by
the judge, rather than the jury, violated defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial).
76. Id. at 264.
77. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1 (2010).
78. Id.; see, e.g., id. § 2B3.1 (dealing with robbery, armed robbery); id. § 2G3.1 (dealing with the
transportation of obscene matter, its provision to minors, and misleading domain names).
79. Id. § 2B1.1.
80. Id.; see also Ramirez, supra note 70, at 378–79.
81. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1(a).
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2010).
83. Three special offense characteristics other than loss enhance a defendant’s sentence for
securities fraud. First, the number of victims of the fraud also enhances the sentence. U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1(b)(2). Second, if the defendant received more than $1 million from the
fraud the level increases by two. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(14). Alternatively, the level increases by four if the
defendant
(i) substantially jeopardized the safety and soundness of a financial institution;
(ii) substantially endangered the solvency or financial security of an organization that, at
any time during the offense, (I) was a publicly traded company; or (II) had 1,000 or more
employees; or (iii) substantially endangered the solvency or financial security of 100 or
more victims.
Id. However, if the defendant’s offense level is below twenty-four, engaging in either of these actions
automatically raises the defendant’s offense level to twenty-four rather than merely adding four levels.
Id. Finally, if the defendant was an officer or director, a registered broker or dealer, or an investment
advisor, her offense level increases by another four levels. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(17).
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84

impact. Under section 2B1.1, the loss enhancement starts at two offense
85
levels for $5000 and increases to thirty levels for $400 million. Without
adding any of the enhancements targeting securities fraud, loss
enhancement can add between seventeen and twenty years to a
86
defendant’s sentence. Moreover, all of the losses resulting from the
“same course of conduct or common scheme” are relevant to the loss
87
calculation. A defendant’s conviction on one count of securities fraud
subjects her to punishment for all of the losses involved with that
conviction.
Under the Guidelines, “loss is the greater of actual loss or intended
88
loss.” The comments define actual loss as “the reasonably foreseeable
pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense” and intended loss as “the
89
pecuniary harm . . . intended to result from the offense.” The comments
further elaborate that “reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm” is the
monetary harm the defendant “knew or . . . reasonably should have
90
known, was a potential result of the offense.” Finally, the guidelines
counsel that “[t]he court need only make a reasonable estimate of the
loss . . . . based on available information” such as “[t]he approximate
number of victims multiplied by the average loss to each victim,” “[t]he
reduction that resulted from the offense in the value” of shares, or
“[m]ore general factors, such as the scope and duration of the offense
91
and revenues generated by similar operations.”
The guidelines provide little direct guidance to courts in calculating
losses. They emphasize the use of judicial discretion: “The sentencing
judge is in a unique position to assess the evidence and estimate the loss
92
based upon that evidence.”
C. Reactions to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
The Guidelines’ new severity for white-collar sentences has
provoked a variety of reactions, which highlight the culpability debates
facing courts. For example, Derick Vollrath noted that the Guidelines’
directives are “unhelpful and circular” and fail to account for “thorny

84. See Peter J. Henning, White Collar Crime Sentences After Booker: Was the Sentencing of
Bernie Ebbers Too Harsh?, 37 McGeorge L. Rev. 757, 767 (2006) (“While various modifications can
have a small effect on the offense level for a defendant in a white collar crime case, the determination
of loss can raise a sentence quickly from modest to substantial.”).
85. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1(b)(1).
86. Depending on the loss, a defendant’s sentence, assuming no criminal history, can jump from a
range of zero to six months to a range of 210 to 262 months. Id.
87. Id. § 1B1.3.
88. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A).
89. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(i)–(ii).
90. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iv).
91. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C).
92. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C).

Connolly_63-HLJ-567 (Do Not Delete)

578

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

1/24/2012 6:29 PM

[Vol. 63:567

93

causation issues.” Similarly, Judge Jed Rakoff in the Southern District
of New York opined that the Guidelines place an “inordinate emphasis”
on the actual or intended financial loss “in an effort to appear
‘objective’ . . . without, however, explaining why it is appropriate to
94
accord such huge weight to such factors.” Ellen Podgor argued, “The
accused becomes irrelevant in a sentencing world ruled by the cold
95
mathematical calculations found in the [S]entencing Guidelines.”
Other commentators approve of the Guidelines’ method for
determining sentences for white-collar criminals. The Guidelines’
harshness serves as an appropriate method of deterrence and retribution,
argued J. Scott Dutcher, in light of the significant economic gain white96
collar crime can produce. Mary Kreiner Ramirez stated, “The dual
purposes of retribution and deterrence support longer terms of
imprisonment” to account for “the nefarious nature of economic
97
crime.”
The Guidelines’ lack of concrete direction and the swirling policies
and motivations for punishing securities fraud are the setting for the two
approaches to loss calculation created by the Ninth Circuit and the
Second and Fifth Circuits.

III. Loss Calculation
The circuits’ split centers on ascertaining the loss that defendants
cause, and the different approaches stem from a nuanced distinction in
classifying a defendant’s culpability for securities fraud. Securities fraud
is not a simple crime because multiple overlapping factors constantly
98
influence the exchanges on which it occurs. Further complicating the
courts’ handling of securities fraud is the courts’ reliance on common law
99
fraud principles to fill in the broad statutory prohibitions. As securities
transactions have become more complicated and nonparties have
become liable, courts have grappled with sorting out the damage from
100
fraud and the losses caused by market fluctuations.
The Supreme Court tackled this issue in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
v. Broudo, which addresses appropriate theories of loss in the civil

93. Vollrath, supra note 13, at 1018.
94. United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
95. Podgor, supra note 38, at 280.
96. Dutcher, supra note 39, at 1305.
97. Ramirez, supra note 70, at 408.
98. Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 811,
820 (2009).
99. Id. at 840; see also Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005) (“The courts have
implied from these statutes and Rule a private damages action, which resembles, but is not identical
to, common-law tort actions for deceit and misrepresentation.”).
100. See Fisch, supra note 98, at 820–21 (describing the courts’ attempts to better define the
causation requirement).
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101

context. This decision, its implications, and its rationales are the
foundation of the Ninth, Second, and Fifth Circuits’ different resolutions
of this question.
A. DURA PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. V. BROUDO
Since 1946, courts have interpreted the Exchange Act to imply a
private cause of action for plaintiffs who claim that defendants have
102
injured them through fraud in the sales of securities. Courts have used
common law fraud elements as the foundation for securities fraud
103
Plaintiffs must show (1) a material misrepresentation,
claims.
(2) scienter, (3) a connection with a purchase or sale of a security,
(4) reliance on the fraud to engage in the transaction, (5) economic harm,
104
and (6) causation between the fraud and the loss the plaintiff sustained.
This last element requires that plaintiffs show that the fraud was a
significant cause of the loss, not just that the fraud was the reason they
105
bought the shares. In Dura Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court
considered whether the inflated-purchase-price theory was sufficient to
106
plead economic harm and proximate causation in civil actions.
1. The Decision
The plaintiffs alleged that Dura Pharmaceuticals (“Dura”) had
made two misrepresentations: first, about one drug’s future profitability,
107
and second, about the likelihood of FDA approval of another drug.
108
The plaintiffs bought shares in the company after these announcements.
When the first drug’s profitability did not meet Dura’s predictions, the
109
share price dropped significantly. Eight months later, Dura announced
that the FDA had not approved the second drug, leading to another
110
drop, but the share price recovered within a week.
The plaintiffs filed a class action suit, using as the end date for
identifying class members the drop in Dura’s share price resulting from
111
the announcement of the first drug’s lower sales. Because the class’s
end date preceded the second drop in the share prices, which resulted
from FDA disapproval of the second drug, the plaintiffs could not allege

101. 544 U.S. at 340.
102. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); Kardon v. Nat’l
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
103. See Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 341.
104. See id. at 341–42.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 339.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 2003).
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that their losses stemmed from the price’s decline after that
112
Instead, the plaintiffs alleged that Dura’s initial
announcement.
statement about the likelihood of the FDA approval, which inflated
113
Dura’s share price, was false. They argued that they had suffered
economic harm because they had relied on those false statements in
114
purchasing shares at the inflated price.
The Ninth Circuit agreed this was a plausible theory of economic
harm because the plaintiffs had suffered injury by paying more for the
115
shares than they were worth. The court also agreed that pleading an
inflated purchase price satisfied the loss-causation element because the
misrepresentation caused the shares to be overvalued, which led to the
116
plaintiffs’ injury of paying more than the actual value of the shares.
In a strongly worded opinion, the Supreme Court reversed, stating,
117
“In our view, this statement of the law is wrong.” According to the
Court, the inflated-price theory fails because at the time of the purchase,
the buyer has not suffered a loss: she holds a share worth the price she
118
paid. An inflated purchase price “might mean a later loss” “after the
119
truth makes its way into the marketplace.” But the Court cautioned
that the lower price “may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but
changed economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new
industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events, which
taken separately or together account for some or all of that lower
120
price.”
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court pointed to the policy
121
justifications for a private cause of action for securities fraud. Private
enforcement serves to deter fraud by compensating shareholders for the
economic harm they actually suffered—not by providing “investment
122
insurance” for market reliability. The Court noted that Congress
intended relief for shareholders only where a plaintiff has met “‘the
burden of proving’ that the defendant’s misrepresentations ‘caused the
123
loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover.’” The Ninth Circuit’s
theory, by contrast, “would allow recovery where a misrepresentation

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 940–41.
Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 339.
Id. at 340.
Broudo, 339 F.3d at 938–39.
Id.
Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 342.
Id.
Id. (emphasis removed).
Id. at 343.
Id. at 345.
Id.
Id. at 345–46 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4)).
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leads to an inflated purchase price but nonetheless does not proximately
124
cause any economic loss.”
2. Analyzing Dura Pharmaceuticals
Both the Ninth Circuit’s and the Supreme Court’s decisions began
with discussions of the harm the shareholders had suffered, but disagreed
125
about the nature of that harm. The Ninth Circuit found that paying an
126
overvalued share price was an injury. The Supreme Court rejected that
127
finding because in the market, the shares are worth the inflated price;
the shareholder could recover the price she paid by selling to another
128
market participant who relied on the same misinformation.
The rationale underlying the Supreme Court’s decision assumes that
the misrepresentation has fooled the entire market. A shareholder
suffers no harm until the truth comes out and she is stuck with shares
that have far less value because of the fraud. In the Court’s view, the
market is like a game of hot potato. Potatoes (shares) bounce between
parties until the music stops—the truth gets out—and only the
shareholder still holding the potato can recover. Of course, other factors
may have changed the desirability of the shares, but those factors do not
constitute damage from the fraud.
When the Court held that an inflated purchase price could not
constitute economic harm, it also precluded plaintiffs from using the
129
inflated-purchase-price theory to show loss causation. The Court
suggests that economic harm occurs when the truth reaches the market,
130
and plaintiffs must show how the truth has harmed them. Because of
the delay in the injury, the plaintiffs have to separate non-fraudulent
131
market factors from the loss caused by the fraud.
In Dura Pharmaceuticals, the Court held only that the inflated-price
132
theory could not be used to plead economic harm or loss causation, but
the Court’s reasoning has had significant impact in lower courts. Lower
courts have interpreted Dura Pharmaceuticals to require that in order to
show economic harm, plaintiffs must allege that the truth was revealed to
133
the market. Lower courts have also required analyses distinguishing
124. Id. at 346.
125. Compare id. at 342, with Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 938–39 (9th Cir. 2003).
126. See Broudo, 339 F.3d at 939.
127. See Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 342.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 343–44.
130. Id. at 343.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 346 (“In sum, we find the Ninth Circuit’s approach inconsistent with the law’s
requirement that a plaintiff prove that the defendant’s misrepresentation (or other fraudulent
conduct) proximately caused the plaintiff’s economic loss. We need not, and do not, consider other
proximate cause or loss-related questions.”).
133. See, e.g., Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257–58 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that the

Connolly_63-HLJ-567 (Do Not Delete)

582

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

1/24/2012 6:29 PM

[Vol. 63:567

between harm caused by the fraud and harm caused by other factors in
134
order to satisfy the loss-causation element.
The circuits have been grappling with reconciling Dura
Pharmaceuticals’ strict rules for civil loss with the expansive criminal
135
sentencing regime. The split created by the Ninth Circuit reflects two
competing interpretations of Dura Pharmaceuticals’ holding negating the
use of the inflated-price theory, which in turn stem from two approaches
to the differing culpabilities of civil and criminal liability.
B. The Second and Fifth Circuits’ Adoptions of DURA
PHARMACEUTICALS

In the aftermath of the Dura Pharmaceuticals decision, the Second
and Fifth Circuits both held that the strict civil loss calculation standard it
suggested also should apply to criminal sentencing.
1. The Decisions
In 2005, the Fifth Circuit heard United States v. Olis, an appeal from
the conviction of Jamie Olis, a tax lawyer at Dynegy Corporation, who
had engaged in a scheme to increase the appearance of Dynegy’s
136
earnings. The SEC uncovered the scheme and forced Dynegy to restate
137
its earnings. The SEC also required Dynegy to publicize the SEC’s
138
Dynergy’s share prices dropped precipitously soon
investigation.
139
after.
140
His
Olis received a 292-month sentence for his conviction.
enhanced sentence resulted from the district court’s finding that the
scheme caused a loss of $105 million to the University of California
141
Retirement System. The loss calculation added twenty-six levels to his
142
base offense level. Combined with other enhancements, Olis’ final

loss had to be caused by the “leaking out of relevant or related truth”); Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc.,
464 F.3d 474, 479 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that the drop in price occurring before the alleged fraud had
been disclosed could not have been caused by the fraud).
134. See, e.g., In re Williams Sec. Litig. WCG Subclass, 558 F.3d 1130, 1139–40 (10th Cir. 2009)
(finding that the expert’s failure to account for other market forces in determining loss made the
determination run afoul of Dura Pharmaceuticals); Ray v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 482 F.3d 991,
995 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding the plaintiffs’ failure to separate the loss caused by fraud from the loss
caused by the overall market decline insufficient to meet Dura Pharmaceuticals’ requirements).
135. Besides Olis, Rutkoske, and Berger, the Tenth Circuit recently considered Dura
Pharmaceuticals’ applicability in the insider-trading context in United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062,
1075 (10th Cir. 2009).
136. United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 541–42 (5th Cir. 2005).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 542.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 543.
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143

offense level was forty, allowing for a range of 292 to 365 months. Olis
appealed, arguing that the loss calculation was a constitutional violation
under Booker because his sentence was dramatically increased based on
144
findings other than those made by the jury.
The Fifth Circuit agreed that the district court failed to meet
Booker’s requirement that lower courts “‘consider’ the guidelines before
145
issuing a ‘reasonable’ sentence.” In particular, the Fifth Circuit found
146
the district court’s method of loss calculation problematic. Instead of
using the actual loss estimate required by the Guidelines, the district
147
court used the university’s loss as shorthand for the losses Olis caused.
The Fifth Circuit opined that the district court’s method “overemphasized
148
[its] discretion as factfinder at the expense of economic analysis.” The
court found that though the Guidelines require only a “reasonable
estimate of loss,” they require the calculation to account only for the loss
149
the defendant caused.
Noting that “the civil damage measure should be the backdrop for
criminal responsibility,” the court found that Dura Pharmaceuticals
provided a model for civil loss calculation that was “attuned to stock
150
market complexities.” Under that model, “there is no loss attributable
to a misrepresentation unless and until the truth is subsequently revealed
151
and the price of the stock accordingly declines.” Looking to Dura
Pharmaceuticals, the Fifth Circuit outlined the proper standard for loss
calculation as a method that eliminated the “extrinsic factors” affecting
152
share price decline, thus uncovering the loss from the fraud. Because
the model requires courts to strip away the effects of other market forces
driving the price down, the Fifth Circuit found that the civil standard
153
more accurately uncovers “actual loss” for the Guidelines.
Finding that the district court’s heuristic use of the university’s loss
failed to account for “extrinsic factors” acting on the shares, the Fifth
154
Circuit held that the district court’s loss calculation was unreasonable.
Olis’ expert had testified that a decline in the market had paralleled
Dynegy’s share decline, and that the stock had begun dropping before
155
news of the fraud had reached the market. His report raised the
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 544 (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005)).
Id. at 548.
Id.
Id. at 545–48.
Id. at 545, 548.
Id. at 546.
Id.
Id. at 548–49.
Id.
Id. at 548.
Id.
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possibility that other forces had led to Dynegy’s share drop, and that
“attributing to Olis the entire stock market decline suffered by one large
or multiple small shareholders . . . would greatly overstate his personal
156
criminal culpability.” Based on this report, the Fifth Circuit vacated the
157
sentence and ordered resentencing.
In United States v. Rutkoske, the Second Circuit also adopted Dura
158
The court
Pharmaceuticals’ reasoning for criminal sentencing.
considered an appeal by David Rutkoske from his conviction and
159
sentencing for securities fraud. Rutkoske was a broker who participated
160
in a scheme to inflate the share price of a gambling corporation. He and
his brokers spread several pieces of misinformation in their attempts to
generate demand for the shares, and eventually the share price
161
plummeted, with investors losing about $12 million. In calculating the
loss, the district court followed the recommendation of an expert witness,
who used the value of the stock three months after the conspiracy ended
162
as a benchmark against which to determine the loss in value. The
163
calculation was not tied to the disclosure of the fraud to the market.
Having previously expressed uneasiness with the severity of the
sentencing in United States v. Ebbers, the Second Circuit reiterated that
“[m]any factors may cause a decline in share price between the time of
the fraud and the revelation of the fraud. In such cases, ‘[l]osses from
causes other than the fraud must be excluded from the loss
164
calculation.’” Citing approvingly to Olis, the Second Circuit held that
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dura Pharmaceuticals applied in loss
165
calculations for criminal sentencing. Using that reasoning, the court
suggested that establishing a loss for purposes of the loss calculation
166
under the Guidelines requires that the fraud is disclosed to the market.
The court instructed lower courts to separate the loss from fraud from
167
“other factors” contributing to the decline in share prices. The Second
Circuit provided further guidance, noting, “Normally, expert opinion and
some consideration of the market in general and relevant segments in
particular will enable a sentencing judge to approximate the extent of
168
loss caused by a defendant’s fraud.”
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id. at 549.
506 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 2007).
Id. at 171.
Id. at 173.
Id.
Id. at 180.
Id.
Id. at 179 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 128 (2d Cir. 2006)).
Id.
Id. at 179–80.
See id.
Id. at 180.
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The Second Circuit found that the district court’s method
insufficiently accounted for the other factors affecting the drop in share
169
price. The expert witness’s calculation attributed to Rutkoske the
170
entire share price decline. The government’s argument that the market
was “thin,” and therefore that the price drop was caused by the fraud,
171
did not convince the court. The district court’s failure to tie its
calculation to the fraud’s disclosure to the market or to account for other
market forces affecting the drop in the share price required
172
resentencing.
2. Analyzing United States v. Rutkoske and United States v. Olis
In adopting Dura Pharmaceuticals, both courts focused on the harm
to shareholders as the basis of the defendant’s culpability. The primary
focus in Dura Pharmaceuticals is the actual pecuniary loss to the
173
shareholders, and the circuit courts in Rutkoske and Olis similarly
174
focused on the loss shareholders sustained. The courts assumed that
the harm for which defendants are liable in the civil context overlaps, or
is even identical to, the harm for which defendants are culpable in the
criminal context. As Dura Pharmaceuticals suggests, in the civil context,
defendants are liable for the losses shareholders sustain after word of the
175
fraud reaches the market and has affected the shares’ value. Rutkoske
and Olis adopted this reasoning to find that a criminal defendant’s
176
culpability rests on the loss in value shareholders sustain.
Conflating the loss in the civil context with the loss in the criminal
context is the premise that drives both courts’ decisions. The Fifth Circuit
justifies this premise by noting the “civil damage measure . . . furnishes
the standard of compensable injury for securities fraud victims and . . . is
177
attuned to stock market complexities.” The Second Circuit noted that
it saw “no reason why considerations relevant to loss causation in a civil
fraud case should not apply, at least as strongly, to a sentencing regime in
which the amount of loss caused by a fraud is a critical determinant of
178
the length of a defendant’s sentence.”

169. Id.
170. Id. at 178.
171. Id. at 180.
172. Id.
173. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005).
174. See Rutkoske, 506 F.3d at 179; United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 546 (5th Cir. 2005).
175. See 544 U.S. at 343–44.
176. See Rutkoske, 506 F.3d at 179 (noting that the calculation centers on “shareholders’ losses”);
Olis, 429 F.3d at 546 (citing Dura Pharmaceuticals in describing the loss calculation requirements for
sentencing).
177. Olis, 429 F.3d at 546.
178. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d at 179.
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The decisions also import the loss-causation reasoning of Dura
179
Pharmaceuticals into the assessment of loss under the Guidelines. The
decisions instruct lower courts to account for other market forces in their
180
analyses of losses for sentencing. The adoption of this reasoning reveals
a concern with the incongruity between long sentences and the
181
culpability of the defendants.
Interestingly, the Guidelines use loss as a way to correct a tendency
to under-sentence white-collar criminals in comparison to their blue182
Using the amount of loss as the primary
collar counterparts.
enhancement appeared to render objective sentences reflecting the
183
As the Second Circuit noted in Ebbers,
defendant’s culpability.
however, the resulting sentences in the securities fraud context are often
184
longer than sentences for violent crimes. Because a corporation may
have billions of shares, a small drop in share price very quickly results in
185
hundreds of millions of dollars in loss.
By adopting the Dura Pharmaceuticals reasoning, the Second and
Fifth Circuits attempted a more equitable correlation between the crime
and the punishment. The decisions reflect a belief, shared in Dura
Pharmaceuticals, that lower courts can isolate the harm caused by a
disclosed fraud by removing other factors affecting share price until they
186
have exposed the decline caused by the fraud. The courts recognize the
difficulty in this proposition, noting that such isolation is neither easy nor
187
exact. And yet, making the attempt to isolate the harm from the fraud

179. Id. at 179; Olis, 429 F.3d at 546.
180. See Rutkoske, 506 F.3d at 179; Olis, 429 F.3d at 548–49.
181. See Rutkoske, 506 F.3d at 179 (“[W]e acknowledged the complexities inherent in calculating
the loss amount but emphasized that ‘[t]he loss must be the result of the fraud.’ Many factors may
cause a decline in share price between the time of the fraud and the revelation of the fraud. In such
cases, ‘[l]osses from causes other than the fraud must be excluded from the loss calculation.’” (quoting
United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 128 (2d Cir. 2006))); Olis, 429 F.3d at 547 (“Sentencing
decisions in these cases acknowledge that because a company’s stock price is affected before and after
the fraud, by numerous extrinsic market influences as well as the soundness of other business decisions
by the company, the calculation of loss attributable to securities fraud requires careful analysis.”).
182. Vollrath, supra note 13, at 1007.
183. See id. at 1007–08.
184. United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 129 (2d Cir. 2006).
185. See id.
186. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d at 180 (“Normally, expert opinion and some consideration of the market
in general and relevant segments in particular will enable a sentencing judge to approximate the extent
of loss caused by a defendant’s fraud.”); Olis, 429 F.3d at 546 (“District courts must take a ‘realistic,
economic approach to determine what losses the defendant truly caused or intended to cause.’”
(quoting United States v. W. Coast Aluminum Heat Treating Co., 265 F.3d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 2001))).
187. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d at 179 (“Determining the extent to which a defendant’s fraud, as
distinguished from market or other forces, caused shareholders’ losses inevitably cannot be an exact
science. The Guidelines’ allowance of a ‘reasonable estimate’ of loss remains pertinent.” (citation
omitted)); Olis, 429 F.3d at 547 (“[G]iven the time and evidentiary constraints on the sentencing
process, the methods adopted in these cases are necessarily less exact than the measure of damage
applicable in civil securities litigation.”).
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seems to ease the courts’ concerns about the disproportionality between
culpability and punishment that can result from the Guidelines’ loss
188
emphasis.
Still, employing the Dura Pharmaceuticals’ loss calculation
reasoning does not prevent long sentences for defendants. As a
hypothetical example, consider John, corporate officer for Acme
Corporation, who issues an earnings statement that materially
misrepresents Acme’s earnings. The next quarter, John’s over-optimism
comes to light and he restates the earnings, admitting simultaneously that
he engaged in fraud. Assuming the market is stable during that period,
any change in the price results exclusively from the fraud.
Upon disclosure, the share price drops only twenty cents, but
189
because Acme has 1 billion shares, the “loss” from the fraud is $200
190
million and adds twenty-eight levels to John’s sentence. Shareholder
harm from the drop in the price depends on the number of shares each
shareholder owns: A shareholder owning twenty percent of the shares
suffers a $40 million loss, whereas a shareholder owning one share loses
only twenty cents. Under the Guidelines and the Second and Fifth
Circuit’s holdings, John’s sentence reflects the entire decline.
Realistically, therefore, the civil loss calculation remains beholden
to the Guidelines’ stiff penalties for large losses. Nevertheless, the
application of the civil loss standard does imply that there is a closer
connection between the fraud and the loss for which the defendant is
being punished.
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Departure
In United States v. Berger, the Ninth Circuit faced an issue similar to
those dealt with by the Fifth and Second Circuits but declined to adopt
191
the Dura Pharmaceuticals reasoning for criminal sentencing. The Ninth
Circuit’s decision reflects a different understanding of the culpability
inherent in securities fraud.
1. The Decision
The Ninth Circuit heard an appeal from Richard Berger, who
protested his sentencing for securities fraud. Berger had continuously
188. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d at 179 (“[W]e see no reason why considerations relevant to loss causation
in a civil fraud case should not apply, at least as strongly, to a sentencing regime in which the amount
of loss caused by a fraud is a critical determinant of the length of a defendant’s sentence.”); Olis, 429
F.3d at 546 (noting that the civil damages loss calculation is appropriate in the criminal context
because it is “attuned to stock market complexities”).
189. This is not an unrealistic number. The Walt Disney Company, for example, has approximately
1.86 billion shares. The Walt Disney Co. (DIS), Street, www.thestreet.com/quote/DIS.html (last
visited Dec. 23, 2011).
190. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2010).
191. 587 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009).
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misrepresented his company’s financial health from its initial public
192
offering through its eventual demise. He failed to report the extent of
the company’s earnings and liabilities, instead stating in disclosures to
193
the SEC that the company had sufficient earnings to cover its loans. In
194
fact, the company was in default.
An audit uncovering the accounting irregularities forced the
company to restate its earnings, leading to a sharp decline in its share
195
price. The share price declined below NASDAQ’s requirements,
196
resulting in the delisting of the company’s shares. News of the
accounting irregularities and the securities fraud did not become public
197
until after the company had already delisted the shares. The district
court used examples of other companies with publicized accounting
irregularities to estimate the loss from the unpublicized fraud in this
198
case. Berger appealed, arguing that the district court should have
applied Dura Pharmaceuticals’ economic harm and causation reasoning
199
in its calculation.
While finding the district court’s calculation flawed, the Ninth
Circuit disagreed that Dura Pharmaceuticals reasoning regarding
200
shareholder losses applied to criminal sentencing loss calculations. In
its explicit departure from the Second Circuit’s holding, the court
reasoned Dura Pharmaceuticals was inapplicable because “the primary
policy rationale . . . for proscribing overvaluation as a valid measure of
201
loss does not apply in a criminal sanctions context.”
The Ninth Circuit asserted that the foundation of common law fraud
underlying the Dura Pharmaceuticals’ requirement referred only to the
202
plaintiff’s burden to show loss. This requirement was distinct from the
criminal context’s concern with “the amount of loss caused, i.e., the harm
203
that society as a whole suffered from the defendant’s fraud.” The court
argued that an inflated purchase price represents “aggregate loss to
society . . . even if various individual victims’ respective losses cannot be
204
precisely determined or linked to the fraud.”
Furthermore, the court found the application of Dura
Pharmaceuticals’ civil rule to criminal sentencing would “clash with the
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 1040–41.
Id. at 1040.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1040–41.
Id. at 1041.
Id.
Id. at 1042.
Id. at 1043.
Id.
Id. at 1044.
Id.
Id.
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parallel principles in the Sentencing Guidelines, which have persuasive
205
value in federal courts.” Looking to the 1995 version of the Guidelines,
the Ninth Circuit noted the endorsement of overvaluation as a method of
206
calculating loss from fraud. The court found that application of Dura
Pharmaceuticals’ reasoning, prohibiting an inflated purchase price as a
method of determining loss, would run directly counter to that
207
endorsement. Moreover, the court opined that the Guidelines required
only a “reasonable estimate of the loss” and offered broad directions
208
about calculation. The court concluded that these directions from the
1995 version allowed, if not condoned, overvaluation as an appropriate
209
method for calculating loss.
Though the court rejected applying Dura Pharmaceuticals’ loss
reasoning, it nevertheless found the district court’s calculation
210
problematic. The district court did not determine the extent to which
Berger’s fraud had overvalued the stock and what loss, in the form of
211
overvaluation, his victims had sustained. Instead, the district court
presumed the loss occurred and then used similar companies’ share price
declines to estimate the amount of decline attributable to Berger’s
212
fraud. The district court’s calculation was an attempt to figure out the
percentage of the drop in share price caused by the fraud, which was
impossible because the fraud did not become public until after the
213
company delisted its shares. The Ninth Circuit remanded, requiring the
district court to determine the inflation in the value of the shares caused
214
by the fraud in order to determine the loss.
2. Analyzing United States v. Berger
In contrast to the Second and Fifth Circuits’ holdings, the Ninth
Circuit’s decision rests on the proposition that harm occurs when the
substance of the fraud enters the market, rather than when the truth
215
becomes known.

205. Id. at 1043.
206. Id. at 1045. The 1995 version of the Guidelines is the applicable standard because Berger’s
fraud ended before the 2001 amendment of the Guidelines. Id. at 1044.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1045.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1046.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See id. at 1044 (“[W]here the value of securities have been inflated by a defendant’s fraud, the
defendant may have caused aggregate loss to society in the amount of the fraud-induced
overvaluation, even if various individual victims’ respective losses cannot be precisely determined or
linked to the fraud.”); see also Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 340 (2005); Broudo v. Dura
Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[L]oss causation does not require pleading a stock
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The Ninth Circuit noted that the difference between the civil and
criminal contexts lies in the policy justifications for each. Civil litigation
216
is an attempt by the shareholder to recover damages from the fraud.
The individualized harm to the shareholder, according to the Supreme
217
Court, occurs only when the truth becomes public. The Ninth Circuit
distinguished the civil harm to individual shareholders from the public
218
harm resulting from the crime of securities fraud. The court’s holding
suggests the harm is the overall deception of the market from the
219
fraud.
Berger differentiated culpability for acting deceitfully from
culpability for shareholder losses resulting from the deceit. The facts of
Berger highlight the distinction. Berger’s fraud did not become public
before the shares were delisted, yet he was culpable for broadcasting
220
fraudulent information to the market and inflating the share prices.
The Ninth Circuit’s holding reflects a belief that there is an important
difference between civil liability, where the focus is compensation, and
221
criminal liability, where the focus is punishment.
The reasoning in Berger is not without issue. First, the Ninth Circuit
relies on the 1995 version of the Guidelines to find that Congress
222
endorsed overvaluation as a method of calculating loss. However, in
the 2001 amendment of the Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission
dropped the overvaluation preference, stating instead that a “reduction
that resulted from the offense in the value of equity securities or other
223
Without an
corporate assets” is a factor in determining loss.
overvaluation preference in the guidelines, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning
for allowing price inflation to show loss is less convincing.
In addition, critics of Berger argue the decision creates a lower
standard of loss calculation than in the civil litigation context, where
224
Dura Pharmaceuticals binds courts. As one critic noted, Berger “will
price drop following a corrective disclosure or otherwise. It merely requires pleading that the price at
the time of purchase was overstated and sufficient identification of the cause.”).
216. Berger, 587 F.3d at 1043–44.
217. Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 343–44.
218. Berger, 587 F.3d at 1044 (“[I]n a private civil fraud action, a court gauges loss from the
perspective of the plaintiff-victim . . . . In criminal sentencing, however, a court gauges the amount of
loss caused . . . .”).
219. Id. (“Criminal sentencing [considers] the harm that society as a whole suffered from the
defendant’s fraud.”).
220. See id. at 1041.
221. See Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 455 (7th Cir. 1982) (“[The] objectives of
tort liability . . . . are to compensate the victims of wrongdoing and to deter future wrongdoing.”);
Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 931, 936
(1984) (noting that criminal law is concerned with societal harm as well as harm to individual victims).
222. Berger, 587 F.3d at 1045.
223. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C)(v) (2010); see also Ramirez, supra
note 70, at 377 (describing the 2001 amendments).
224. James A. Jones II, Note, United States v. Berger: The Rejection of Civil Loss Causation
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cause further inflated sentences in securities fraud cases in which
defendants are already subject to disproportionately high loss tables and
225
multiple, redundant upward adjustments.” Another noted that the
Ninth Circuit’s decision will affect “pretrial negotiations among
prosecutors and criminal securities fraud defendants” because defendants
could face “a potentially greater sentence based on the sentencing court’s
226
calculation of loss under Berger.”
But these criticisms fail to take account of the distinction in Dura
227
Pharmaceuticals between economic harm and loss causation. In Berger,
the Ninth Circuit rejected only the Supreme Court’s reasoning that for
harm or loss to occur there must be disclosure of the fraud to the
228
market. It implicitly accepted the Court’s reasoning that loss must be
the result of the fraud, noting that whether loss stems from the disclosure
229
of the fraud or from price inflation, it must be the product of the fraud.
Berger does not permit district courts to attribute loss to the defendant
without showing a link between the loss and the fraud; in fact, in Berger,
the district court’s failure to make that link caused the Ninth Circuit to
230
remand the case.
D. Reaching a Workable Loss Calculation
A workable loss calculation must address the policies underlying the
regime of criminal sentencing, namely that of effective deterrence and
fair punishment. The Ninth Circuit’s approach, with certain
modifications, more closely approaches this balance.
Loss calculation should focus on the culpability of the defendant
rather than on the individual harm. Disclosure of the fraud to the market
should not be a requirement in assessing the damage caused by the
defendant. Criminalizing securities fraud reflects society’s intolerance for
both the inefficiencies caused by the fraud and for the harm individuals
231
Private civil litigation suitably provides
suffer from the fraud.

Principles in Connection with Criminal Securities Fraud, 6 Wash. J.L. Tech. & Arts 273, 283 (2011);
A. Jeff Ifrah & Rachel Hirsch, Circuits Split Over Securities Fraud Sentencing, Ifrah Law (July 19,
2010), http://www.ifrahlaw.com/circuits-split-over-securities-fraud-sentencing/; Gregory L. Poe,
Sentencing in Fraud Cases Involving Shareholder Loss, Fed. Criminal Practice Blog (Dec. 31, 2009),
http://blog.gpoelaw.com/sentencing-in-fraud-cases-involving-shareholder-loss/.
225. Ifrah & Hirsch, supra note 224.
226. Jones, supra note 224, at 283.
227. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (noting that the inflated-purchaseprice theory would eliminate both the “economic loss” and “proximate causation” elements from a
securities fraud cause of action).
228. United States v. Berger, 587 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e decline to require, in
finding facts relevant to sentencing, a showing that ‘share price fell significantly after the truth became
known.’” (quoting Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 347)).
229. Id. at 1043 (noting the requirement that the loss be caused by the defendant’s fraud).
230. Id. at 1046.
231. See, e.g., Message from the President—Regulation of Securities Exchanges, 78 Cong. Rec.
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shareholders with the opportunity to recover for their individual harm.
In contrast, criminal liability reflects the government’s attempt to
regulate the market broadly and to deter behavior that impacts the
market beyond the harm sustained by shareholders of the affected
232
company.
In a situation like that in Berger, where the fraud never becomes
public, a defendant unduly benefits under Dura Pharmaceuticals by
continuing to hide the fraud. For example, under Dura Pharmaceuticals,
Berger might have escaped any loss enhancement for his actions. He lied
about the company’s profitability and liabilities, but the truth—that the
company was never profitable and had substantial debt—did not come to
233
light until after the shares were delisted. The drop in share price
preceding the delisting resulted from the company’s current unprofitable
state, not from the knowledge that the company was never profitable.
Under a Dura Pharmaceuticals analysis, such losses are not the
result of the fraud; they are the result of the current condition of the
company. This result is incongruous with Berger’s culpability. He is
guilty because he misrepresented the state of his company, which led to a
market-wide deception about the appropriate value of the company’s
shares. Returning to the “hot potato” metaphor, Berger is responsible
for creating the game in the first place: he started passing the potato and
he started playing the music. Adopting the Dura Pharmaceuticals
economic-loss reasoning means he escapes liability because people
dropped the potato before he stopped the music. As Miriam Baer has
noted, corporate officials already benefit from continuing the fraud;
requiring Dura Pharmaceuticals to apply in every situation of loss
234
calculation would increase that incentive.
A price-inflation theory allows courts to discount the mitigating
effects on the share-price decline of the publicity surrounding the
235
discovery of the fraud. Information about the investigation may cause
236
share-price decline before the truth itself becomes public. The decline
after the broadcasting of the fraud may be much less than the overall
2264–72 (1934), reprinted in 4 Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933 & Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, at 2264 (2001) (“I therefore recommend to the Congress the enactment of
legislation providing for the regulation by the Federal Government of the operations of exchanges
dealing in securities and commodities for the protection of investors, for the safeguarding of values,
and, so far as it may be possible, for the elimination of unnecessary, unwise, and destructive
speculation.”).
232. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2010); cf. Prentice, supra note 42, at 830 (“[S]tringent securities laws
shape morals and behavior.”).
233. Berger, 587 F.3d at 1040–41.
234. See Baer, supra note 37, at 1362 (“[Dura Pharmaceuticals] unwittingly perpetuates the
corporate executive’s naïve hope that better information will surface in the future and thereby
counteract the fraud.”).
235. Fisch, supra note 98, at 848–49.
236. See id.

Connolly_63-HLJ-567 (Do Not Delete)

January 2012]

1/24/2012 6:29 PM

PLAYING HOT POTATO IN THE MARKET

593

drop in the share price or than the inflation of the value of the shares
237
because of the fraud. Under Dura Pharmaceuticals, district courts
238
remove these “extrinsic factors” from their calculation of the loss. This
process incentivizes defendants to time disclosure of the fraud until the
prices have dropped independently, either from the investigation or from
239
outside market forces.
The Commission should amend the Guidelines to again endorse
overvaluation as a method of calculating loss. This step would more
closely align the Guidelines with the culpability of white-collar
defendants and would provide greater guidance to courts in assessing
loss. Alternatively, the Supreme Court should address the circuits’
dispute by allowing price inflation as a means of determining loss under
the guidelines.
While the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning more accurately accounts for
the government’s interests in regulating the markets, Berger fails to
provide a sufficiently rigorous framework for calculating loss under a
price-inflation theory. Whether the Commission amends the Guidelines
or the Supreme Court accepts the price-inflation theory, courts should
explicitly adopt the causation reasoning in Dura Pharmaceuticals and
require expert testimony and examination of the inflated purchase-price
numbers by district courts. Nevertheless, a price-inflation theory actually
parallels modern finance theory more closely than the Dura
240
Pharmaceuticals reasoning and may prove to be more workable.
Even if the Commission fails to amend the Guidelines, a priceinflation theory works within the current Guidelines. The Guidelines
allow courts to use gain as a determinate of loss where “there is a loss but
241
it reasonably cannot be determined.” If the market does not discover
the truth while shares remain on the exchange, it is nearly impossible to
determine the reduction in the shares’ value that resulted from the fraud.
In those situations, price inflation is a valid method for calculating the
gain a defendant earned from his fraud.
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, even if modified and rigorously
examined, may result in long sentences for white-collar criminals. The
Guidelines, as the product of Congress’s powers, reflect a policy decision
to assign securities fraud defendants lengthy sentences based on their
242
culpability. The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning more closely aligns with that
policy.

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.
See supra note 134.
Fisch, supra note 98, at 852.
Id. at 845.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(B) (2010).
See supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also Vollrath, supra note 13, at 1020–23.
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Conclusion
Congress passed the Exchange Act over eighty years ago with the
intent of providing reliable markets for the American population. To
ensure that benefit, Congress has authorized criminal liability for
particularly culpable behavior in violations of the Act. Securities fraud
destabilizes markets and injures individual shareholders through the
spread of false information, and Congress has signaled the seriousness of
committing securities fraud by providing a twenty-year statutory
maximum sentence.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Berger accords more closely with
Congress’s intentions. By targeting the culpable behavior rather than
individual loss, the Ninth Circuit has closed a loophole under the
Guidelines: Defendants cannot hide their fraudulent behavior and
fortuitously disclose it only when the shares have declined from other
causes. Combined with a rigorous standard for causation, price inflation
is an appropriate means to establish loss under the Guidelines. The
Commission should amend the Guidelines to reflect that fact.

